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OPINION OF THE COURT

STAPLETON, Circuit Judge:

We are here asked to decide whether a victim of a
privately executed wiretap1 can successfully move to quash a
subpoena duces tecum directing the perpetrator of the wiretap to
convey recordings of unlawfully intercepted communications to a
grand jury.

The district court denied the motions to quash.

Since disclosure of the unlawfully intercepted communications to
the grand jury would violate an explicit congressional
prohibition, and enforcement of the subpoena would involve the
courts in a violation of the victims’ statutory privacy rights,
we will reverse the district court and remand with orders that
the subpoena duces tecum be quashed.

I.
A.

Background

Factual and Procedural History

Because this case relates to an ongoing grand jury
proceeding, we will not refer to the parties by their proper
names.

We will also limit our recitation of the facts to the

minimum necessary to explain and resolve the issues presented.
Fortunately, the relevant facts are undisputed.
1

"Wiretapping" is a general term used to refer to all types
of illegal interceptions, including surreptitious recording of
telephone conversations.

2

Appellant-intervenor John Doe 1 is the target of a
federal grand jury investigation (hereinafter "Doe 1" or "the
target").

Doe 1 lived for some time with his brother, John Doe 2

("Doe 2" or "the husband"), and his brother’s wife, John Doe 3
("Doe 3" or "the witness").

For reasons that we need not detail,

the witness installed devices on her home telephones that
intercepted and recorded telephone conversations initiated from
and coming into the home.

Both the target and the husband were

parties to some of these conversations.

Neither the target nor

the husband knew that their conversations were being intercepted
and recorded, so neither therefore consented to the interception
and recording.
Several weeks after the last conversation was recorded,
appellee, the United States (“the government”), learned through
an informant that the witness possessed tapes containing
recordings of conversations involving the target and the husband.
The grand jury issued two subpoenas directed to the witness: a
subpoena ad testificandum, requiring her to appear and answer
questions before the grand jury, and a subpoena duces tecum,
requiring her to produce the tapes so they may be played for the
grand jury.

Only the subpoena duces tecum is involved in this

appeal.2

2

In a related case, In re Grand Jury, No. 97-7018, this
court denied the witness’ motions to quash both of the subpoenas.
The witness had moved to quash on the basis of the privilege
against adverse spousal testimony.

3

The target and the husband filed motions to intervene
and motions to quash the subpoena duces tecum directed to the
witness.

Their motions contend that the target and husband are

“aggrieved persons” within the meaning of § 2510(11) of Title III
of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968
(hereinafter “Title III” or “the Act”), 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2522,
because they were parties to telephone communications unlawfully
intercepted without their knowledge or consent.

Citing § 2515 of

Title III, the target and husband argue that the contents of the
tapes cannot be disclosed to the grand jury because such
disclosure would be a violation of § 2511(1)(c).
Although the witness appeared before the grand jury and
answered some of the government’s questions, she refused to
produce the tapes.

The government therefore moved to compel the

witness’ full compliance with both subpoenas.

The district court

granted the government’s motion and, after further resistance
from the witness, entered an order holding the witness in
contempt.

The district court also granted the target and

husband’s motions to intervene but denied their motions to
quash.3

While acknowledging that Doe 3's wiretap violated Title

III, the court agreed with the government that the evidentiary
prohibition of § 2515 contains a “clean hands” exception
permitting the submission of evidence of unlawfully intercepted
3

The court did grant the motions to quash to the extent the
subpoenas sought materials which would reveal confidential
attorney-client or marital communications. The government did
not oppose granting the motions with regard to these two
privileges and these issues are not before us in this appeal.
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communications to a grand jury where the violation was committed
by a private party acting independent of the government.

The

target and the husband then filed this appeal.4

B.

Statutory Structure of Title III

“Title III’s complex provisions regulate both
interception and disclosure of communications in great detail.”
United States v. Cianfrani, 573 F.2d 835, 855 (3d Cir. 1978).
Various provisions of the Act are directly relevant to the
jurisdictional and merits issues presented in this appeal.
Before proceeding to those issues, it will be useful to describe
the statutory structure of Title III and to set out the
provisions that are most important to this case.5
Section 2511(1)(a) makes it a crime for any person to
intentionally intercept or endeavor to intercept any wire, oral,
or electronic communication.
id. § 2510 (definitions).

18 U.S.C. § 2511(1)(a); see also

Section 2511(1)(c) makes any

disclosure of unlawfully intercepted communications a further
4

This appeal presents solely questions of law, over which we
exercise plenary review. See United States v. Hayden, 64 F.3d
126, 128 (3d Cir. 1995).
5

Most of the provisions not discussed in the text relate
either to manufacture and confiscation of communication
intercepting devices, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2512 & 2513, or to the
procedures whereby government investigative and law enforcement
officers can obtain authorization to intercept communications and
disclose and use the contents of them, id. §§ 2516-2519. Other
sections provide for the Attorney General to seek an injunction
against any person engaged in or about to engage in a felony
violation of Title III, id. § 2521, and for a court authorizing
an interception to order a noncomplying telecommunications
carrier to comply with the order, id. § 2522.
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violation of the statute.

It provides for criminal punishment of

any person who “intentionally discloses, or endeavors to
disclose, to any other person the contents of any wire, oral, or
electronic communication, knowing or having reason to know that
the information was obtained through the interception of a wire,
oral, or electronic communication in violation of this
subsection.”

Id. § 2511(1)(c).

In addition to criminal

sanctions against those who unlawfully intercept communications,
the statute also provides a civil remedy.

Under § 2520, “any

person whose wire, oral, or electronic communication is
intercepted, disclosed, or intentionally used in violation of
this chapter may in a civil action recover from the person or
entity which engaged in that violation such relief as may be
appropriate.”

Id. § 2520(a).

As a third remedy for violations of § 2511, “Title III
contains a strict exclusionary rule,” Cianfrani, 573 F.2d at 855,
prohibiting use of intercepted wire or oral communications and
the fruits thereof in specified proceedings, including, in
particular, grand jury proceedings. Section 2515 provides that:
Whenever any wire or oral communication has
been intercepted, no part of the contents of
such communication and no evidence derived
therefrom may be received in evidence in any
trial, hearing, or other proceeding in or
before any court, grand jury, department,
officer, agency, regulatory body, legislative
committee, or other authority of the United
States, a State, or a political subdivision
thereof if the disclosure of that information
would be in violation of this chapter.
18 U.S.C. § 2515.
Finally, § 2518(10)(a)(i) authorizes any “aggrieved

6

person”--that is, “a person who was a party to any intercepted
wire, oral, or electronic communication or a person against whom
the interception was directed,” id. § 2510(11)--to move to
suppress the contents of any unlawfully intercepted
communication. It states:
Any aggrieved person in any trial, hearing,
or proceeding in or before any court,
department, officer, agency, regulatory body,
or other authority of the United States, a
State, or a political subdivision thereof,
may move to suppress the contents of any wire
or oral communication intercepted pursuant to
this chapter, or evidence derived therefrom,
on the grounds that-(i) the communication was unlawfully
intercepted . . . .
Id. § 2518(10)(a)(i).6
Here, the target and the husband claim to be aggrieved
persons within the meaning of § 2510, and they seek to enforce
§ 2515's exclusionary rule to prohibit introduction to the grand
jury of communications unlawfully intercepted by the witness.

In

response, the government stresses that § 2518 does not list grand
jury proceedings among the proceedings in which an aggrieved
person may move to suppress evidence.

The government further

contends that, even if the target and husband can properly move
to enforce § 2515 in the context of a grand jury investigation,
§ 2515 contains a “clean hands” exception that permits disclosure
to a grand jury of communications that were unlawfully
6

Aggrieved persons may also move to suppress on the grounds
that the communication was intercepted pursuant to a court
authorization that was insufficient on its face or intercepted in
a manner not in conformity with an appropriate authorization.
See 18 U.S.C. § 2518(10)(a)(ii)-(iii).
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intercepted by a private party without government complicity.

II.

Standing and Jurisdiction

The government argues that the target and the husband
lacked standing to proceed before the district court and now lack
standing to proceed before us.

The government also claims that

we have no jurisdiction because the district court’s denial of
Doe 1 and Doe 2’s motions is not a final order.
unpersuaded by the government’s arguments.

We are

We conclude that the

target and husband had standing to file their motion in the
district court and that they continue to have standing to press
this appeal.

Moreover, because the subpoena was not directed to

them, the husband and target did not have the option of being
held in contempt and creating an immediately appealable order.
Therefore, the denial of their motions to quash is a final order.

A.

Standing

“In essence the question of standing is whether the
litigant is entitled to have the court decide the merits of the
dispute . . . .”

Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975).

Here the government argues that neither the district court nor
this court could decide the merits of Doe 1 and Doe 2's motions
to quash the subpoena.

8

Both standing to sue and standing to appeal have
constitutional as well as prudential elements.

See Public

Interest Research Group of New Jersey, Inc. v. Powell Duffryn
Terminals, Inc., 913 F.2d 64, 70 n.3 (3d Cir. 1990) (referring to
standing to sue); In re Grand Jury Matter (District Council 33),
770 F.2d 36, 39 (3d Cir. 1985) (standing to appeal); see also
Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation
of Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 471-76 (1982)
(discussing constitutional and prudential standing requirements);
Wheeler v. Travelers Ins. Co., 22 F.3d 534, 537-38 (3d Cir. 1994)
(same).

The constitutional requirement of standing ensures that

the “irreducible minimum” for Article III federal court
jurisdiction, that there be “a case or controversy,” is present.
Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 472.

“Art. III requires the party who

invokes the court’s authority to show that he personally has
suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of the
putatively illegal conduct of the defendant, and that the injury
fairly can be traced to the challenged action and is likely to be
redressed by a favorable decision . . . .”
quotations and citations omitted).

Id. at 472 (internal

Thus, the three requirements

for constitutional standing are injury in fact, causation, and
redressability.

See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S.

555, 560-61 (1992).
The same constitutional minima for standing to sue are
also required for standing to appeal.

To ensure that the appeals

court is hearing an actual case or controversy, the appellant
must be aggrieved by the district court order.

9

See McLaughlin v.

Pernsley, 876 F.2d 308, 313 (3d Cir. 1989).
In the instant case, there can be no doubt that the
target and husband meet the requirements for constitutional
standing.

Doe 1 and Doe 2 have had their telephone

communications unlawfully intercepted and recorded by Doe 3,
making them “aggrieved persons” within the meaning of Title III.
18 U.S.C. § 2510(11).

The Act makes each disclosure of an

unlawfully intercepted communication a separate violation, see
id. § 2511(1)(c), so Doe 1 and Doe 2 would be injured in fact by
further invasion of their privacy from disclosure of their
communications to the grand jury.7

The causes of this injury are

the subpoena and the government’s motion to compel, and the
injury is redressable by quashing the subpoena.

Since both

intervenors remain aggrieved after the district court’s
disposition, the constitutional requirements for standing to
appeal as well as standing to sue are satisfied.8
Whether the intervenors also satisfy the prudential
7

“Congress may enact statutes creating legal rights, the
invasion of which creates standing, even though no injury would
exist without the statute.” Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S.
614, 617 n.3 (1973).
8

That Doe 1 and Doe 2 satisfied the requirements for
intervening in the district court does not automatically mean
they also satisfy the constitutional requirements for appellate
standing. See Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54, 68 (1986). “The
relationship between the interests required for intervention in
the district court and the interests required to confer Article
III standing on appeal has not been clearly delineated.”
McLaughlin, 876 F.2d at 313-14. In the instant case, the
government does not appeal the district court’s ruling for
appellants’ on their motions to intervene. Hence, we are only
reviewing whether Doe 1 and Doe 2 have standing, and this is not
the occasion to attempt to clarify the relationship between the
requirements for intervention and standing to appeal.

10

aspects of the standing requirement presents a more complex
issue.

Cf. Franchise Tax Board of California v. Alcan Aluminum

Ltd., 493 U.S. 331, 336 (1990) (finding that respondents easily
satisfied constitutional requirements for standing, but that more
searching inquiry was necessary to determine if prudential
requirements were also met).

We recently described the concept

of prudential standing in the following manner:
Prudential considerations further limit a
plaintiff’s ability to establish that she has
standing. These considerations require that:
(1) a litigant "assert his [or her] own legal
interests rather than those of third
parties," (2) courts “refrain from
adjudicating 'abstract questions of wide
public significance' which amount to
'generalized grievances,'" and (3) a litigant
demonstrate that her interests are arguably
within the "zone of interests" intended to be
protected by the statute, rule or
constitutional provision on which the claim
is based. The federal courts have adopted
prudential limits on standing in order "to
avoid deciding questions of broad social
import where no individual rights would be
vindicated and to limit access to the federal
courts to those litigants best suited to
assert a particular claim."
Wheeler, 22 F.3d at 538 (citations omitted).
None of the prudential concerns discussed in Wheeler
bars the target and husband from having standing to sue or
standing to appeal in this case.

In both the district court and

here, the intervenors are asserting their own legal interests
under Title III.

Although they seek to quash a subpoena directed

to a third party, and though their success in quashing that
subpoena would have legal consequences for the witness, the
target and husband’s claim is based on protecting their own
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statutory right to privacy by preventing a further disclosure of
their communications.9

Their claim presents neither an abstract

question nor a generalized grievance.

Instead, it presents a

precise question arising from a specific grievance about the use
of grand jury subpoena power to compel production of recordings
made in violation of the law.

The privacy interests the target

and husband assert are certainly within the “zone of interests”
that Title III is intended to protect.

Because it is Doe 1 and

Doe 2 whose privacy has been violated and would again be violated
by compliance with the subpoena, and since Doe 3 is the
perpetrator of the unlawful recordings, it is the intervenors and
not the witness herself who are best suited to assert the Title
III claim.

Recognizing standing in the target and husband in no

way threatens to enmesh the federal courts in an action where no
individual rights could be vindicated.

9

Even if Doe 1 and Doe 2 are viewed as asserting the
interests of Doe 3 and not of themselves, this would not
necessarily deprive them of standing. We apply a balancing test
to determine whether a litigant has prudential standing to bring
an action on behalf of a third party. See Wheeler, 22 F.3d at
539 n.11. The factors we consider in applying this test include
potential conflicts of interest between the litigant and the
third party, obstacles to suit by the third party, and the
closeness of the relationship between the litigant and the third
party. See id. Since we conclude that the target and husband
have prudential standing to assert their own interests under
Title III, we need not decide whether they would have standing to
assert the witness’ interests.

12

The three prudential considerations we described in
Wheeler are the three which are referred to most commonly in
discussions of prudential standing.

See, e.g., Stehney v. Perry,

101 F.3d 925, 930-31 (3d Cir. 1996) (applying Wheeler
considerations, finding that litigant satisfied all three, and
concluding that litigant had prudential standing); UPS Worldwide
Forwarding, Inc. v. United States Postal Serv., 66 F.3d 621, 62631 (3d Cir. 1995) (same).

However, neither this court nor the

Supreme Court has restricted the scope of prudential analysis to
just these three considerations.

See generally Allen v. Wright,

468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984) (“Standing doctrine embraces several
judicially self-imposed limits on the exercise of federal
jurisdiction, such as [the three considerations listed in
Wheeler].") (emphasis added).

Indeed, the Supreme Court has

insisted that “standing in its outer dimensions is a prudential
concept to be shaped by the decisions of the courts as a matter
of sound judicial policy and subject to the control of Congress."
Asarco Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U.S. 605, 613 (1989); see also
Bennett v. Spear, ___ U.S. ___, 117 S. Ct. 1154, 1161 (1997)
(stating that Congress can modify or abrogate prudential standing
requirements).

This can only mean that lower courts, when

confronted with a question of whether to recognize prudential
standing in a particular litigant, must consider all factors
relevant to making "sound judicial policy."
It is therefore appropriate to consider an additional
prudential concern in determining whether to recognize standing
in this case.

Specifically, we must consider whether finding
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standing in Doe 1 and Doe 2 would unduly impede the grand jury
investigatory process and thereby frustrate the public interest
in fair and expeditious administration of the criminal laws.
generally United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 17 (1973).

See
“As

a necessary consequence of its investigatory function, the grand
jury paints with a broad brush.”

United States v. R.

Enterprises, Inc., 498 U.S. 292, 297 (1991).

“Traditionally the

grand jury has been accorded wide latitude to inquire into
violations of criminal law.”
338, 343 (1974).

United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S.

However, it is equally true that “the powers of

the grand jury are not unlimited.”

Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S.

665, 688 (1972); see also R. Enterprises, 498 U.S. at 299;
Dionisio, 410 U.S. at 11.

Just as grand juries must operate

within the confines of the Constitution, see Branzburg, 408 U.S.
at 708, so too must they comply with the limitations imposed on
them by Congress (as long as those limitations are not
unconstitutional).
We perceive two ways in which a recognition of standing
here might be regarded as having a potential to impede the grand
jury's investigative process.

First, in those instances where a

subpoena is quashed, this would, of course, deprive the grand
jury of information it would otherwise have.

But this kind of

deprivation is properly attributable to Congress and cannot be
cited as a prudential basis for denying standing.

Congress

decided when it adopted § 2515 that the grand jury is not
permitted to receive the type of evidence sought by the subpoena
here.
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Second, a recognition of standing in situations such as
this one will undoubtedly result in delays in grand jury
investigations while trial courts are ruling on motions to quash
and appellate courts are reviewing those rulings.

While we

acknowledge the general undesirability of such delays, it is
nevertheless true that motion to quash practice has not
traditionally been regarded as an unreasonable burden on grand
jury proceedings.

This is true whether the motion to quash is

filed by the subject of a subpoena or by a third party with an
important interest at stake.
The Supreme Court and this court have on several
occasions allowed third parties to move to quash grand jury
subpoenas directed to others.

See generally Stehney, 101 F.3d at

931 (after concluding that constitutional and prudential standing
requirements were satisfied, stating that another reason for
recognizing standing is that courts have done so for similarlysituated plaintiffs in other cases).

It is well-established that

a litigant may have sufficiently important, legally-cognizable
interests in the materials or testimony sought by a grand jury
subpoena issued to another person to give the litigant standing
to challenge the validity of that subpoena.

See, e.g., Gravel v.

United States, 408 U.S. 606 (1972) (asserting constitutional
privilege, U.S. Senator may move to intervene and quash subpoena
directed at his assistant); In re Grand Jury Matter (JFK
Hospital), 802 F.2d 96, 99 (3d Cir. 1986) (assuming intervenor
has proprietary interest in third party’s subpoenaed records,
intervenor has standing to appeal denial of motion to quash

15

subpoena); District Council 33, 770 F.2d at 39 (same); In re
Grand Jury Proceedings (FMC Corp.), 604 F.2d 798, 801 (3d Cir.
1979) (allowing nonsubpoenaed client to intervene and appeal
order directed to subpoenaed attorney that affected attorneyclient privilege); In re Grand Jury Investigation (Intervenor A),
587 F.2d 589, 594 (3d Cir. 1978) (asserting invasion of
privilege, Representative has standing to intervene and move to
quash subpoena directed to Clerk of House of Representatives); In
the Matter of Grand Jury Impaneled Jan. 21, 1976 (Freedman), 541
F.2d 373, 377 (3d Cir. 1976) (holding that attorney has standing
to intervene and challenge subpoena directed at prothonotary on
basis of attorney’s claim of privilege).
In In re Matter of Grand Jury (Schmidt), 619 F.2d 1022,
1026-27 (3d Cir. 1980), we discussed the types of interests that
may be asserted by a party other than the subject of the grand
jury subpoena if that party is to have standing to quash the
subpoena.10

There a federal grand jury had directed subpoenas ad

testificandum to six employees of Schmidt.

Schmidt moved to

intervene and to quash the subpoenas, arguing that the grand jury
was not investigating federal crimes and that the subpoenas were,
therefore, abusive.

Prior to Schmidt, all of our cases

recognizing intervenor standing to quash a subpoena directed at
10

Schmidt’s discussion of the intervenor-employer’s standing
to move to quash a subpoena directed at its employees does not
distinguish between standing to sue and standing to appeal. See
619 F.2d at 1026-27. Yet, by deciding that the employer had
standing to move to quash the subpoena, and by reaching the
merits of its claims on appeal, we necessarily found that the
employer had both standing to sue and standing to appeal.
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another had involved intervenors with a property interest in, or
claim of privilege respecting, the information or materials
sought by the subpoena.

Thus, the government urged us to hold

that standing in this context could only be present in those who
could claim a property interest or privilege that had been (or
would be) invaded by compliance with the subpoena.
We rejected this limitation as nonviable, explaining
that we could imagine cases where other "valued rights" besides
property or privilege would be affected and the intervenor would
have standing. Id. at 1026. We concluded:
Third party standing to assert claims of grand jury
abuse cannot be determined by categorizing
the claimed interest as one of property or
privilege, but only by examining the nature
of the abuse, and asking whether, and in what
manner, it impinges upon the legitimate
interests of the party allegedly abused.
Id. at 1027; see also United States v. Raineri, 670 F.2d 702, 712
(7th Cir. 1982) (citing Schmidt, explaining that “party has
standing to move to quash a subpoena addressed to another if the
subpoena infringes upon the movant’s legitimate interests,” and
holding that prosecutor had standing to move to quash trial
subpoena based on his interests in having trial proceed
expeditiously and without harassment to witness or undue
prejudice to his case); but see In re Subpoenas to Local 478, 708
F.2d 65, 72-73 (2d Cir. 1983) (criticizing Schmidt and saying
that third party has standing to appeal denial of motion to quash
only where district court’s order affects “fundamental rights
whose legal and practical value will be destroyed if not
vindicated on collateral review”).

17

Here, the interests asserted by the target and the
husband can fairly be said to resemble a privilege.

In light of

Schmidt, however, we need not characterize their interests as
such in order to find standing.

While Schmidt involved a motion

to quash a subpoena ad testificandum on the basis of alleged
grand jury abuse in the form of investigation of non-federal
crimes, Schmidt’s reasoning, and particularly its rejection of
restricting standing solely to property or privilege interests,
applies beyond these narrow factual and legal circumstances.
Difficult questions may arise as to whether an
intervenor’s interest, if not a property interest or a privilege,
is the kind of interest on which third party standing to quash a
subpoena may be predicated, but we do not believe the instant
case presents a difficult question.

The husband and target have

moved to quash the witness’ subpoena in order to protect privacy
interests created and protected by Title III.

Title III is

intended to give “maximum protection” to these privacy interests,
Cianfrani, 573 F.2d at 857, interests which we have found
“sufficiently weighty” to justify even limitations on the Sixth
Amendment right of public access to court proceedings.

Id. at

856-57 (ordering that pretrial hearings be closed to public to
extent reasonably necessary to protect against disclosure of
unlawfully intercepted communications).

The Act protects the

privacy interests asserted here by making it a crime for
unlawfully intercepted communications to be disclosed to anyone,
including the grand jury, § 2511(1)(c), and by additionally and
explicitly prohibiting presentation of such evidence to a grand
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jury, § 2515.

For the district court to compel enforcement of

the subpoena would, if Doe 1 and Doe 2 are right on the merits,
be in direct contradiction of these statutory provisions, and
would therefore involve the district court in the commission of a
federal crime.
We conclude that the privacy interests protected by
Title III, which expressly include the interests in not having
one’s unlawfully intercepted communications disclosed to a grand
jury or otherwise disclosed, are interests on which one may
predicate standing to quash a subpoena, including a subpoena
directed to another person.

Accordingly, we hold that Doe 1 and

Doe 2 satisfy the constitutional and prudential requirements for
both standing to sue and standing to appeal.
Before turning to the government's attack on our
appellate jurisdiction, we pause to consider another contention
the government advances, erroneously we think, as a standing
argument.

It is that Doe 1 and Doe 2 are entitled to no relief

because § 2518(10)(a)(i) does not authorize a motion to suppress
in a grand jury proceeding.

We believe this is more accurately

characterized as a contention that one in the position of Doe 1
and Doe 2 lacks a cause of action to seek the relief sought
here.11

While we agree that § 2518(10)(a)(i) does not confer

11

See generally Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 239 n.18
(1979) (“[S]tanding is a question of whether a plaintiff is
sufficiently adversary to a defendant to create an Art. III case
or controversy, or at least to overcome prudential limitations on
federal-court jurisdiction, cause of action is a question of
whether a particular plaintiff is a member of the class of
litigants that may, as a matter of law, appropriately invoke the
power of the court . . . .”) (citations omitted).
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upon Doe 1 and Doe 2 a right to secure a suppression order in the
present context, we conclude that Federal Rule of Criminal
Procedure 17(c) and the traditional motion to quash practice that
it authorizes do confer upon them a cause of action to move to
quash the subpoena duces tecum.
Under § 2518(10)(a)(i), an aggrieved person such as the
target and the husband “may move to suppress the contents of any
wire or oral communication intercepted pursuant to this chapter
or evidence derived therefrom, on the grounds that . . . the
communication was unlawfully intercepted.”

Section 2518 lists a

number of proceedings in which an aggrieved person may file such
a motion to suppress, but grand jury proceedings are absent from
this list.

Therefore, as we observed in a prior case,

§ 2518(10)(a) does not authorize a victim of an illegal wiretap
to move to suppress unlawful Title III evidence before the grand
jury.

See In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Egan), 450 F.2d 199, 206

(3d Cir. 1971), aff'd, Gelbard v. United States, 408 U.S. 41
(1972); see also United States v. Woods, 544 F.2d 242, 248 (6th
Cir. 1976) (holding that § 2518(10)(a) does not authorize grand

20

jury target to file pre-indictment motion to suppress); Dudley v.
United States, 427 F.2d 1140, 1141-42 (5th Cir. 1970) (same).
Here, however, Doe 1 and Doe 2 did not file motions to
suppress.

Instead, they filed motions to quash a subpoena.

Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 17(c) creates a right in
specified circumstances to secure relief from a court in the form
of an order quashing a grand jury subpoena duces tecum.

Rule

17(c) states: “The court on motion made promptly may quash or
modify the subpoena if compliance would be unreasonable or
oppressive.”

Despite the importance of a generally unfettered

grand jury investigative process, “the grand jury’s subpoena
power is not unlimited,” Calandra, 414 U.S. at 346, and Rule
17(c) motions to quash are indisputably one of the “limit[s]
imposed on a grand jury.”

R. Enterprises, 498 U.S. at 299; see

also Calandra, 414 U.S. at 346 n.4.

“Grand juries are subject to

judicial control and subpoenas to motions to quash.”

Branzburg,

408 U.S. at 708; see also In re Horn, 976 F.2d 1314 (9th Cir.
1992) (granting attorney’s Rule 17(c) motion to quash subpoena
that was overbroad and unreasonable because compliance would
violate attorney-client privilege).
There is nothing in the language or structure of Rule
17(c) or Title III suggesting that Rule 17(c) cannot be used by a
victim of an unlawful interception to protect his or her privacy
interests under Title III.

We read Congress’s decision not to

authorize a motion to suppress evidence before the grand jury as
nothing more than that.

If Congress had also intended to

prohibit third parties from using traditional motion to quash
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practice to enforce their rights under Title III, we believe it
would have done so by stating in Title III that § 2518(10)(a)(i)
is the exclusive means of enforcing § 2515 in a grand jury
context.12

We therefore hold that Rule 17(c) provides a cause of

action for an aggrieved person to move to quash a grand jury
12

The government relies heavily on the following statement
in the legislative history:
[Section 2518(10)(a)] must be read in connection with
section[] 2515 . . . which it limits. It provides the
remedy for the right created by section 2515. Because
no person is a party as such to a grand jury
proceeding, the provision does not envision the making
of a motion to suppress in the context of such a
proceeding itself. Normally, there is no limitation on
the character of evidence that may be presented to a
grand jury, which is enforcible [sic] by an individual.
There is no intent to change this general rule. It is
the intent of the provision only that when a motion to
suppress is granted in another context, its scope may
include use in a future grand jury proceeding.
S. Rep. No. 90-1097, reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2112, 2195.
The drafter of § 2518(10)(a) clearly regarded a grand jury
proceeding as something distinct from a court proceeding, and
sought not to alter the general rule that motions to suppress
cannot be filed in a pre-indictment setting. The legislative
history, like the Act itself, is silent on motions to quash.
Nothing in the legislative history of § 2518(10)(a) suggests that
Congress made a decision that traditional motion to quash
practice before a court would be unavailable to an aggrieved
party. Nor has the government suggested any reason why Congress,
after specifically prohibiting the use of illegally intercepted
communications by a grand jury, might have wanted that practice
to be unavailable. In this connection, we note that Congress
clearly did not intend that all persons aggrieved by grand jury
conduct in violation of § 2515 have no remedy other than
§ 2518(10)(a). As we have pointed out, § 2520 provides an
aggrieved party with a civil action against a violator to recover
"such relief as may be appropriate." Moreover, as the Supreme
Court held in Gelbard v. United States, 408 U.S. 41 (1972), it is
entirely consistent with the Congressional intent behind Title
III for those aggrieved persons who are the subject of a grand
jury subpoena to simply refuse to comply and use § 2515 as a
shield in the ensuing contempt proceeding.
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subpoena duces tecum compliance with which would violate §§ 2515
and 2511(1)(c).
In reaching this conclusion, we reject the notion that
there is something inherently inconsistent about a party having a
right to quash a grand jury subpoena duces tecum when he or she
has no right to move to suppress the evidence that is the subject
of the subpoena.

The relief that may result from the

intervenors’ motion to quash is equivalent to the relief that
would result from a successful motion to suppress only because
the government does not possess the evidence the grand jury has
ordered to be produced.

In the large number of cases where the

government already has the evidence that an aggrieved person
asserts cannot be introduced to the grand jury, a motion to quash
will do the aggrieved person no good, because there will be no
subpoena to be quashed.

Here, however, the grand jury must

employ its subpoena powers and the enforcement authority of the
courts to obtain the evidence it seeks.

We do not believe

Congress intended the grand jury and the courts to use their
respective powers to compel violations of Title III.

When a

subpoena is required to gain access to illegally intercepted
communications, the independent checks on use of the subpoena
power provide a cause of action to enforce the § 2515 evidentiary
prohibition.
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B.

Final Order

In order for us to have appellate jurisdiction, the
target and husband must not only have standing to appeal; the
district court’s order must also be a final order as to them.
See JFK Hospital, 802 F.2d at 99; District Council 33, 770 F.2d
at 38.

Since we find that the denial of their motions to quash

was a final order, we conclude that we have jurisdiction to reach
the merits of this appeal.
An order denying a motion to quash is generally not a
final order permitting immediate appellate review unless the
movant is held in contempt.

See United States v. Ryan, 402 U.S.

530 (1971); Cobbledick v. United States, 309 U.S. 323 (1940);
Alexander v. United States, 201 U.S. 117 (1906).

“Where,

however, a person lacks the opportunity to contest the subpoena
by disobedience because it is not directed to him or her, an
order denying a motion to quash is final as to that individual.”
District Council 33, 770 F.2d at 38; see also Schmidt, 619 F.2d
at 1024-25.

“The court’s order denying a motion to quash is

effectively a final order to those who have no further steps they
can follow.”

JFK Hospital, 802 F.2d at 98 (finding denial of

motion to quash to be final order with respect to intervenors who
could not proceed to contempt or order subject of subpoena to do
so); see also District Council 33, 770 F.2d at 38 (same).

When

an intervenor does not have the option of contempt, the denial of
an intervenor’s motion to quash must be treated as final to
provide effective appellate review, since the subject of the
subpoena will frequently be unwilling to suffer the penalties of
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contempt in order to protect the intervenor's interest.
Corp., 604 F.2d at 800-01.

See FMC

Without immediate appeal, there would

be no other proceeding in which the intervenor’s claim could be
asserted.

See Schmidt, 619 F.2d at 1025.
The district court’s denial of Doe 1 and Doe 2's

motions to quash is a final order as to them.

Since the subpoena

is directed to Doe 3 and not to themselves, the target and
husband do not have the option of creating an appealable order by
standing in contempt.

Although the witness has, thus far, been

willing to be held in contempt, she has done so on her own
behalf, on grounds entirely different from those the intervenors
have asserted.

There is no guarantee she will continue to

accept contempt, and the target and husband’s opportunity for
appellate review should not be dependent on her willingness to do
so.

III.

Merits

We come, finally, to the merits of the intervenors’
motions to quash the grand jury subpoena duces tecum issued to
the witness.

The target and the husband contend that the motion

must be quashed because compliance with it would constitute a
violation of § 2515, prohibiting introduction to a grand jury of
unlawfully intercepted communications, and of § 2511(1)(c),
prohibiting disclosure of unlawfully intercepted communications.
We agree.
The government does not contest that compliance with a
subpoena requiring a violation of §§ 2515 and 2511(1)(c) would be
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"unreasonable" within the meaning of Federal Rule of Criminal
Procedure 17(c).

Nor does it dispute that compliance with the

subpoena duces tecum currently before us would be a violation of
the literal terms of §§ 2515 and 2511(1)(c).
good faith contend otherwise.

It could not in

The language of § 2515 could not

be any clearer: “Whenever any wire or oral communication has been
intercepted, no part of the contents of such communication and no
evidence derived therefrom may be received in evidence in any
. . . proceeding . . . before any . . . grand jury . . . if the
disclosure of that information would be in violation of this
chapter.”

18 U.S.C. § 2515.

Section 2511(1)(c) is also

unambiguous, making it a crime whenever one "intentionally
discloses, or endeavors to disclose, to any person the contents
of any wire, oral, or electronic communication, knowing or having
reason to know that the information was obtained through the
interception of a wire, oral, or electronic communication in
violation of this subsection."

Id. § 2511(1)(c).

Since it is

conceded by all parties that Doe 3's interceptions were made in
violation of § 2511(1)(a), and disclosure of the contents of the
intercepted communications would be a violation of § 2511(1)(c),
the plain language of § 2515 prohibits use of the subpoenaed
materials as grand jury evidence.
Yet, despite these concessions, the government insists
that the district court properly denied Doe 1 and Doe 2 relief
because there is an unarticulated "clean hands" exception to the
strictures of §§ 2515 and 2511(1)(c).
13

We are not persuaded.13

We note that two other federal circuit courts have been
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It is true, as the government emphasizes, that “in rare
cases [where] the literal application of a statute will produce a
result demonstrably at odds with the intentions of its drafters,”
Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 570-71
(1982), we may look to those intentions rather than the literal
terms of the statute.

See also United States v. American

Trucking Ass’ns, Inc., 310 U.S. 534, 542-44 (1940) (“When [a
statute’s plain] meaning has led to absurd or futile results
. . . this Court has looked beyond the words to the purpose of
the act.

Frequently . . . even when the plain meaning did not

produce absurd results but merely an unreasonable one plainly at
variance with the policy of the legislation as a whole this Court
has followed that purpose, rather than the literal words.”)
(internal quotations and footnotes omitted).
“rare case,” however.

This is not such a

Literal application of §§ 2515 and

2511(1)(c) means only that the grand jury cannot hear the
contents of unlawfully intercepted communications.

This protects

the privacy of Doe 1 and Doe 2 from further invasions, consistent
with the intent of Title III.

Thus, application of the plain

language of §§ 2515 and 2511(1)(c) leads to no absurd, futile, or
even unreasonable result in this case.

Cf. United States v.

Underhill, 813 F.2d 105, 111-12 (6th Cir. 1987) (departing from
plain language where it would allow defendant to shield himself
presented with the question of whether to read this same clean
hands exception into § 2515 and have reached conflicting
conclusions. See United States v. Murdock, 63 F.3d 1391 (6th
Cir. 1995) (deciding that § 2515 does contain clean hands
exception); United States v. Vest, 813 F.2d 477 (1st Cir. 1987)
(rejecting clean hands exception).
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from prosecution under anti-gambling statute by suppressing
communications he unlawfully intercepted to further illicit
gambling scheme, clearly an absurd and unintended result of Title
III).
Even if we were prepared to ignore the literal language
of the statute, however, we find no other indication that
Congress intended the clean hands exception the government would
have us read into §§ 2515 and 2511(1)(c).

The statutory

structure makes it clear that any interceptions of communications
and invasions of individual privacy are prohibited unless
expressly authorized in Title III.
Cianfrani, 573 F.2d at 855.

See Gelbard, 408 U.S. at 46;

The invasion of Doe 1 and Doe 2's

privacy that would result from introduction of Doe 3's recordings
to the grand jury is nowhere expressly authorized under Title
III, clearly suggesting that Congress intended no clean hands
exception.
The government cites a statement in the legislative
history, to the effect that “[t]he perpetrator must be denied the
fruits of his unlawful actions in civil and criminal
proceedings,” 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2156, to support its
contention that Congress did not intend to deprive the government
of the use of unlawful evidence when the government is not the
“perpetrator” of the illegal interception.

But this statement

evidences no intent that a non-perpetrator may use the fruits of
another’s unlawful actions.

To the contrary, the statute and its

legislative history provide that anyone who discloses the
contents of a communication knowing it to be the fruit of an
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illegal invasion of privacy is guilty of a criminal offense, see
18 U.S.C. § 2511(1)(c); 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2181-82, and
likewise § 2515's evidentiary prohibition must be applied to
perpetrators and non-perpetrators alike.
Moreover, if we were to concern ourselves with the
cleanliness of hands, there would be no reason to limit our
consideration to the hands of the government alone.

It is the

grand jury that issued the subpoena, and it is the district court
that ordered it to be enforced.

Given the unambiguous language

of § 2515, compliance with the subpoena would be a violation of
an express congressional prohibition.

Were we to allow a

compelled violation of this federal law, the hands of the grand
jury, the district court, and ourselves would all become sullied.
See Egan, 450 F.2d at 209 ("It seems beyond question that a
district court may not compel the violation of an express
congressional prohibition.").

Since § 2515 was enacted, in part,

"to protect the integrity of court . . . proceedings," Gelbard,
408 U.S. at 51 (internal quotations omitted), Congress cannot
have intended that we ignore any taint on grand jury and judicial
hands.

In short, it is incomprehensible that Congress intended

the admissibility of unlawfully intercepted communications to
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turn solely on whether the government participated in the
interceptions.
We agree with the intervenors that, when enacting Title
III, Congress performed all of the balancing necessary of the
public interest in law enforcement against the privacy interests
of citizens. As we said in Cianfrani,
Congress’s overriding interest in protecting
privacy to the maximum extent possible is
evident in Title III. The legislative
history of the statute emphasizes the concern
of its drafters that the Act preserve as much
as could be preserved of the privacy of
communications, consistent with the
legitimate law enforcement needs that the
statute also sought to effectuate.
Similarly, the complex and overlapping
provisions are strong evidence that Congress
intended to regulate strictly disclosure of
intercepted communications, limiting the
public revelation of even interceptions
obtained in accordance with the Act to
certain narrowly defined circumstances.
573 F.2d at 856.

We have no authority to restrike the balance

that Congress has already struck by placing in the statute a
clean hands exception that Congress did not.
In sum, Title III is designed to protect the privacy of
communications and the integrity of the courts.

Compliance with

the subpoena duces tecum directed to Doe 3 would violate § 2515's
evidentiary prohibition and would work a further invasion of Doe
1 and Doe 2's privacy rights in violation of § 2511(1)(c).
Compliance with the subpoena would, therefore, be unreasonable,
and the subpoena must be quashed.
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IV.

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, we will reverse the district
court, and remand with an order to grant the intervenors’ motions
to quash the subpoena duces tecum.
In re Grand Jury, Nos. 97-7016/17

SLOVITER, dissenting.
I do not disagree with the proposition that a
person aggrieved under Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and
Safe Streets Act of 1968, codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§
2510-2522 (“Title III”), should have the right to preclude the
use of illegally intercepted communications at a criminal
proceeding, whether or not the government was responsible for the
interception.

Nor do I disagree with the proposition that such a

person should have the right at an appropriate time to quash a
subpoena issued to a third person ordering production of such
communications.

However, I do disagree with the majority’s

holding that a third party, such as a target or subject of a
grand jury investigation, may move to quash the subpoena issued
to a witness during the grand jury investigation.

This holding

runs counter to the well-established precedent disallowing
procedures that would delay and disrupt grand jury proceedings.
While I share the majority’s disapproval of the witness’s actions
in illegally intercepting communications, I believe that the
majority’s interpretation of Title III is contrary to the
statutory framework and the prudential principles underlying the
statute.

Therefore, I respectfully dissent and would affirm the

31

district court’s dismissal of the intervenors’ motions to quash
for lack of standing.
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A.
My difference with the majority is narrow insofar
as the scope of the substantive provisions of Title III are
concerned, but fundamental insofar as its enforcement provisions
are concerned.

As the majority points out, § 2515 provides a

categorical exclusionary remedy for violations of Title III,
expressly proscribing the admission of illegally wiretapped
evidence in various specified proceedings, including grand jury
proceedings.
executing.

But the exclusionary remedy of § 2515 is not selfThe legislative history of Title III explains that §

2515 “must, of course, be read in light of § 2518(10)(a) . . . ,
which defines the class entitled to make a motion to suppress.”
S. Rep. No. 90-1097 (1968), reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2112,
2185 [”Senate Report”].

Significantly, § 2518(10)(a) does not

list a grand jury investigation among the list of specified
proceedings in which suppression motions may be filed.
It is this tension between the two sections that
forms the basis of my difference with the majority.

I believe

that we are bound by the statutory language, and that what
appears to be a paradoxical result - one section granting a right
and the other withholding a remedy - is reconcilable by a literal
reading of the statute and the explanation given in the
legislative history.

Congress saw the two provisions as

dependent and reflexive; Congress intended § 2518(10)(a) to
restrict § 2515.

The Senate Report states that § 2518(10)(a)

“must be read in connection with sections 2515 and 2517, . . .
which it limits.

It provides the remedy for the right created by
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section 2515.”

Id. at 2195.
By relying on Rule 17(c) of the Federal Rules of

Criminal Procedure, the majority glides over the fact that §
2518(10)(a), which gives aggrieved persons the right to file
motions to suppress such intercepted communications at various
proceedings, conspicuously omits proceedings before the grand
jury.

Rule 17(c) governs motions to quash subpoenas when

“compliance would be unreasonable or oppressive.”
P. 17(c).

Fed. R. Crim.

But a rule cannot trump a statute, and the majority’s

solution undermines the clearly discernible policy goal of §
2518(10)(a)'s limitation on the filing of motions to suppress,
namely, to prevent interference and delay with grand jury
investigations.

This policy applies with equal force to the

filing of motions to quash.
The reason for the omission of grand jury
proceedings from the suppression provision of § 2518(10)(a) is
set forth in the Senate Report, which states:
Because no person is a party as such to a grand
jury proceeding, the provision does
not envision the making of a motion
to suppress in the context of such
a proceeding itself. Normally
there is no limitation on the
character of evidence that may be
presented to a grand jury, which is
enforceable by an individual.
(Blue v. United States, 86 S.Ct.
1416, 384 U.S. 251 (1965).) There
is no intent to change this general
rule.
S. Rep. No. 90-1097, reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2195
(emphasis added).
It was this policy and similar explanations in the
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legislative history commenting on the language of Title III that
led the Supreme Court in Gelbard v. United States, 408 U.S. 41
(1972), a case on which the majority relies, to distinguish
between a grand jury witness who seeks to stand on the illegality
of the interception as a basis for refusal to answer and a nonwitness potential defendant who seeks to intrude into the grand
jury proceedings.

After undertaking a thorough analysis of the

legislative history of Title III, the Court held that a witness
in a grand jury proceeding who was cited for contempt for refusal
to answer questions that were based upon illegally intercepted
communications could use the suppression provision of § 2515 as a
“just cause” defense.

See Gelbard, 408 U.S. at 59.

The Court

concluded that a witness was not foreclosed from using § 2515's
remedy only because that witness was not a target of a grand jury
investigation.

See id.

The Court stated in broad terms equally

applicable here,
The congressional concern with the applicability
of § 2518(10)(a) in grand jury
proceedings, so far as it is
discernible from the Senate report,
was apparently that defendants and
potential defendants might be able
to utilize suppression motions to
impede the issuance of indictments.
. . .
Id. at 59-60 (emphasis added).
As the court commented in United States v. Woods,
544 F.2d 242, 249 (6th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 954
(1977),

Gelbard “drew a careful distinction between a witness

before the grand jury, who it held may refuse to answer questions
based upon illegal interceptions, and a defendant or potential
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defendant.”
The “general rule” referred to in the Senate
Report and incorporated into the statute was described in United
States v. Blue, 384 U.S. 251 (1966), a case in which a defendant
sought pretrial dismissal of his indictment on tax fraud charges
on the ground that it was procured in violation of his Fifth
Amendment right against self-incrimination.

The district court

granted the motion, but the Supreme Court reversed.

It explained

that because criminal defendants have an opportunity to vindicate
their rights at trial, they should not be permitted to interrupt
the normal progress of a grand jury investigation.

Id. at 255

(commenting that because tainted evidence is admissible in grand
jury proceedings a defendant would only be able to suppress such
evidence or “its fruits if they were sought to be used against
him at trial”).
The Senate Report accompanying Title III cited to
Blue, a reference that was noted by the Supreme Court in Gelbard,
408 U.S. at 60.

Gelbard affirmed our decision in In re Grand

Jury (Egan), 450 F.2d 199 (3d Cir. 1971), where we stated:
The reference in the legislative history [of Title
III] to Blue demonstrates at most a
congressional intent to preclude an
attack on a grand jury
investigation by one whose interest
in such investigation is not as a
witness, but as a defendant, and
instead to require such person to
move for the exclusion of the
questionable evidence after the
indictment or at a time designated
by the rules of criminal procedure.

Egan, 450 F.2d at 205.

We held that Sister Egan, a witness who
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refused to answer questions in a grand jury proceeding, could
invoke the § 2515 remedy because she was not a prospective
defendant, and thus was “not attempting to block an indictment
that might be returned by the grand jury, but rather is asserting
her right as a citizen to vindicate her privilege.”

Id. at 205-

06.
The structure of the relevant provisions of Title
III and its legislative history show that Congress intended to
prevent targets and subjects of grand jury investigations, who
would have the opportunity to challenge illegally intercepted
communications at trial, from filing any motions that would
inhibit the functioning of the grand jury.
It is true, as the majority notes, that motions to
quash are not expressly proscribed by Title III.

However, in

light of Congress’s emphasis on protecting the uninterrupted
functioning of the grand jury, we must interpret Title III in a
way that channels motions to quash a subpoena duces tecum, like
motions to suppress, to trial proceedings, rather than to grand
jury proceedings.

The inclusion of grand jury proceedings in the

exclusionary remedy of § 2515 entitles a grand jury witness, but
not third parties, to rely on that provision.
The congressional intentions behind Title III flow
from the unique role occupied by the grand jury.

It conducts an

inquisitorial proceeding that seeks to determine if a crime has
been committed or if criminal charges should be brought against
any person, rather than an adversarial proceeding in which guilt
or innocence is determined. See United States v. R. Enterprises,
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Inc., 498 U.S. 292, 297 (1991).
Consistent with this function, numerous procedures
are permitted in the grand jury that would not be acceptable in a
criminal trial.

The grand jury “paints with a broad brush,” id.,

and the scope of its investigative power is necessarily very
broad.

See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 701 (1972) (“A

grand jury investigation is not fully carried out until every
available clue has been run down and all witnesses examined in
every proper way to find if a crime has been committed.”
(internal quotations omitted)).

It conducts its investigation in

the absence of a judge, deliberates in secret, and is not
restrained by the technical rules of procedure and evidence that
govern criminal trials.

See United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S.

338, 344 (1974).
As the Supreme Court said of the grand jury nearly
eighty years ago:
It is a grand inquest, a body with powers of
investigation and inquisition, the
scope of whose inquiries is not to
be limited narrowly by questions of
propriety or forecasts of the
probable result of the
investigation, or by doubts whether
any particular individual will be
found properly subject to an
accusation of crime.
Blair v. United States, 250 U.S. 273, 282 (1919) (witness not
entitled to make objections based on irrelevance or
incompetence); see also Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359,
364 (1956) (hearsay rules inapplicable to grand jury proceedings
because strict observance of such rules “would result in
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interminable delay but add nothing to the assurance of a fair
trial”); Lawn v. United States, 335 U.S. 339-350 (1958)
(indictment not open to challenge on ground that it was procured
in violation of Fifth Amendment).
Solicitude for the proper and efficient
functioning of the grand jury has made the Court reluctant to
authorize procedures that would allow “protracted interruption of
grand jury proceedings.”
concurring).

Gelbard, 408 U.S. at 70 (White, J.,

Thus, in Calandra, the Court held that the

exclusionary rule for alleged Fourth Amendment violations would
not be available at the grand jury stage because the hearings
necessitated by such a rule “would halt the orderly progress of
an investigation and might necessitate extended litigation of
issues only tangentially related to the grand jury’s primary
objective.”

414 U.S. at 349.
In R. Enterprises, the Court held that the

standards set out in United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 699700 (1974), for relevancy and admissibility of documents sought
by a subpoena duces tecum in the trial stage were not applicable
at the grand jury stage because such rules would invite
unacceptable “procedural delays and detours.”
498 U.S. at 298.

R. Enterprises,

After noting that “We have expressly stated

that grand jury proceedings should be free of such delays,” the
Court quoted United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 17 (1973),
for the proposition that:

“‘Any holding that would straddle a

grand jury with minitrials and preliminary showings would
assuredly impede its investigation and frustrate the public’s
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interest in the fair and expeditious administration of the
criminal laws.’” Id. at 298-99 (quoting Dionisio, 410 U.S. at
17).
If intervenors were permitted to file motions to
quash subpoenas duces tecum, the grand jury would be straddled
with precisely the delay and disruption that Congress sought to
avoid.

There are numerous potential issues for side litigation

in a statute as complex as Title III, such as whether an
intervenor was an “aggrieved person” according to § 2510(11) or
whether there was in fact a statutory violation under § 2511.
The majority’s ruling would require adversarial hearings on
matters peripheral to the grand jury’s investigation and could
effectively transform the grand jury proceeding into a
“preliminary trial[] on the merits” in a way that the Court in
Calandra found unacceptable.

Calandra, 414 U.S. at 350.

The

consequential appeal, as here, if an intervenor has standing will
necessarily produce further unacceptable delays in the grand
jury’s work.
I am not convinced that the delay and disruption
to the grand jury proceedings that the majority’s holding will
cause are offset by the benefits of the majority’s ruling.
Allowing parties to exclude such evidence at the grand jury stage
will do little to prevent future violations of the statute,
particularly among private citizens.

See Calandra, 414 U.S. at

351 (“[a]ny incremental deterrent effect which might be achieved
by extending the [exclusionary] rule to grand jury proceedings is
uncertain at best”).

And Congress’s effort to protect an
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aggrieved person from the disclosure of illegally intercepted
communications, repeatedly stressed by appellants, must be viewed
in the context of Congress’s evident contemplation that such
communications would indeed be disclosed in grand jury
proceedings by its exclusion from § 2518(10)(a) of motions to
suppress before the grand jury.
As a result, I believe that under Title III thirdparty motions to quash, like motions to suppress, are precluded
at the grand jury stage in the interest of the efficient
administration of the grand jury process.
B.
As the majority correctly notes, there have been
cases in which third parties have been accorded standing to file
motions to quash grand jury subpoenas where a privilege accorded
by the Constitution, a statute, or common law was at stake.

See,

e.g., Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606 (1972) (speech and
debate clause privilege entitled U.S. Senator to quash subpoena
directed at aide); In re Grand Jury Proceedings (FMC Corp.), 604
F.2d 798, 801 (3d Cir. 1979) (allowing client to intervene to
challenge subpoena issued to attorney); see also In re Grand Jury
Matter (John F. Kennedy Memorial Hospital), 802 F.2d 96, 99(3d
Cir. 1986) (third parties accorded standing where their property
interests were jeopardized).

In those situations, the protection

afforded by the privilege is destroyed as soon as the privileged
material is introduced, whether at the grand jury or at trial.
Communications illegally intercepted are not in the same position
because, as set forth in the prior section, Congress recognized
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that disclosure of those communications would occur at the grand
jury stage when it limited the suppression remedy by omitting the
grand jury in § 2518(10)(a).
The majority relies on dictum from In re Matter of
Grand Jury (C. Schmidt & Sons, Inc.), 619 F.2d 1022, 1026-27 (3d
Cir. 1980), where there was reference in the majority opinion to
“imagined” instances where other “valued rights” at stake would
trigger third party standing to quash subpoenas.

Id. at 1026;

but see In re Subpoena to Local 478, 708 F.2d 65, 73 (2d Cir.
1983) (Schmidt “lacks a limiting principle”).

In Schmidt, where

we granted third-party standing, there were a variety of
interests asserted by the third-party intervenor, including the
contractual property interest in the service of employees who
were subject to a subpoena ad testificandum, a property interest
in the books and records previously subpoenaed, and, most
fundamentally, the right not to be subject to abuse of the grand
jury’s process.

In the latter instance, a third-party motion to

quash is the only mechanism available to challenge the potential
abuse.

None of these considerations is applicable here where

there is no allegation of grand jury abuse.

Therefore, the usual

presumption accorded to the legitimacy of grand jury proceedings
applies.

See R. Enterprises, 498 U.S. at 300.
Unlike the third parties hypothesized in Schmidt,

the intervenors here will have an opportunity to challenge the
statutory violation through a motion to quash or to suppress the
resulting evidence at the start of their criminal trial should an
indictment against them emerge from the grand jury.
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They also

have the right, under the statute, to sue the interceptor of the
illegal wiretap for civil damages whether or not they are
ultimately indicted, see § 2520(a), and can file a complaint
leading to a criminal prosecution of the interceptor,
see 2511(1)(c).
C.
In sum, I conclude that the statutory framework of
Title III as well as congressional intentions regarding the
appropriate mechanisms to redress violations of Title III
foreclose the intervenors from filing motions to quash subpoena
duces tecum issued as part of a grand jury investigation.
Accordingly, I would affirm the district court’s dismissal of the
intervenors’ motions.
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